Erdogan secures all democratic avenues that threaten his position in latest referendum 
Turkey’s president, Recep Tayyip Erdogan, is celebrating yet another victory for his agenda over the future of his country. Having risen up the ranks from playing football in the streets of Istanbul’s notorious Kasimpasa district, to becoming Turkey’s first ever democratically elected head of state, Erdogan cemented his spot on 16th April 2017 not only as a leader, but as a man who has finally rid his country from western-backed puppet regimes. 
In what was arguably the most crucial polls ever held in the history of the Republic of Turkey, 51.4 per cent of Turkish citizens backed constitutional reforms that will see Turkey transform its parliamentary system into an executive presidency. This means that the office of the prime minister will be terminated, and the role of the president, which was traditionally symbolic, will become more hands-on. 
Unlike <a href="https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=it1a6RnzuwY">some reports</a> published in mainstream western media, Turkey is not becoming an Islamic state under the rule of one man. Turkey will remain a republic, constitutionally secular, and will have a multi-party parliament with scheduled democratic elections. 
The reforms pave the way for Erdogan to return to the governing Justice and Development Party (AKP), which he founded and led until laws under the existing constitution stipulated that he had to resign in order to assume the presidency in August 2014. In other words, the constitutional reforms that were approved by the Turkish public, albeit narrowly, will make the Turkish political system resemble that which is currently in implementation in the US. 
In practice, things will more or less remain unchanged. Although Erdogan officially resigned from the AKP, his influence over the party’s policies never waned. Erdogan himself nominated his original replacement for the prime ministry and the party’s leadership, former foreign minister Ahmet Davutoglu. But when differences emerged between them, Davutoglu stepped down, making way for Transport Minister Binali Yildirim to take his place. 
Yildirim, who now serves as the soon-to-be-defunct prime minister, is known to be Erdogan’s “yes man” and virtually nothing has been done to hide this fact. Yildirim took on the post knowing full well that his primary purpose after being chosen was to fill the void until the time came to eventually make himself redundant. And that’s exactly what he did by giving the AKP’s backing for the reforms. 
So by returning to lead the AKP, the current de facto situation will simply become official. By removing the prime minister from the equation, the reforms will also eliminate coalition governments which often leave the country with two opposing heads of state – a problem that has slowed decision-making in Turkey by keeping the country in a state of political schizophrenia. 
Of course, this change in the constitution has not settled well with Turkey’s main opposition, the Republican People’s Party (CHP), which under its present leader Kemal Kilicdaroglu has lost at eight polls since he became the party’s head seven years ago. The CHP’s only realistic chance of ever coming to power was through negotiating its way into coalition governments, but under the new constitution, this will be impossible. Considering that in the last general election the CHP garnered just 25 per cent of the popular vote, a little over half the votes garnered by the AKP, it is also highly unlikely that the CHP will secure a majority in the parliament, at least in the foreseeable future. 
The CHP’s core support base comes from staunchly secular Turkish nationalists known as Kemalists, named after the founding father of the Turkish republic, Mustafa Kemal Ataturk. Although their ideals, inspired by French laicism, never really filtered down to Turkey’s largely conservative and rural Muslim population, a series of interventions by the Turkish military since 1960 made sure that the Kemalists maintained their influence over the society. 
But Erdogan, despite the odds against him, has single-handedly turned Kemalist political dominance over the country on its head. Having once been imprisoned and banned from politics for reading a controversial poem, Erdogan, a former mayor of Istanbul, continued to struggle after his comeback. He survived attempts to close down his party as well as numerous plots to overthrow or undermine him in the form of corruption scandals, terror attacks and military coups. 
Each attempt to bring Erdogan down has only made him stronger in the eyes of his supporters, many of whom had their way of life suppressed for decades under the Kemalist regime. Through economic initiatives and investments, Erdogan has empowered the conservative Turkish middle class, which comprises the largest chunk of Turkey’s ethnically, religiously and culturally diverse society. And while his policies on those who fall outside of that category may be subject to criticism, supporters and opponents alike will acknowledge that never in the history of Turkey has any other leader done more to <a href="http://www.al-monitor.com/pulse/originals/2013/09/democratization-package-kurds-turkey-minorities.html">boost rights for Turkey’s minority groups</a>, even if they fall short of the mark. 
Critics will undoubtedly question whether there is truth in the graft allegations against Erdogan’s administration, as well as conspiracy theories over whether a <a href="http://www.the-platform.org.uk/2016/08/02/turkeys-attempted-coup-let-the-wounds-heal-first/">failed coup attempt last July</a> was a deliberately orchestrated hijacking of Turkey’s political narrative. It is, after all, their democratic right to do so. There are also serious claims of election fraud during the April 16 referendum. This is due to the Supreme Electoral Board’s (YSK) last minute decision to count votes that were missing the official stamp, which was supposed to be placed on all ballots before the polls opened. Although the YSK said this was a normal procedure that had been used before, the opposition argues that the move was a breach of election rules. Again, it is a democratic right of all citizens to appeal and demand independent investigations into such matters – a right the Turkish government has not denied to its citizens. 
Even if the allegations against his administration were true, the current Turkish government would be no more guilty of such crimes than previous administrations, or for that matter, potential alternative administrations today. The difference is, Erdogan’s administration has earned the reputation of being one that gives back to its people. This is not an attempt to justify the alleged crimes, but under such circumstances, the Turkish people seem willing to fight and die for an administration that has relieved pressures from the repressive Kemalist regime that only favoured a minority of privileged elites. 
Speculation aside, <a href="https://www.nytimes.com/2017/04/17/world/europe/turkey-referendum-erdogan.html">Erdogan’s popularity in Turkey</a> continues to soar while the Turkish opposition struggles to articulate its concerns to the Turkish people. The CHP boycotted the entire process of drawing up Turkey’s new constitution and opposed the referendum completely. Of course, they had their reasons for doing so, but by putting their principles over politics, they missed another golden opportunity to be involved in Turkey’s political process. 
Erdogan may not be the most politically correct leader, and his hands may not be the cleanest. Perhaps in a country where the standards are a little higher, Erdogan might have easily been dismissed as a fringe candidate who would at best be elected as the MP of a small constituency. But so long as the Turkish opposition holds down the bar of competition, Erdogan and his administration will remain in power. For the time being, with no equal in the rival camp, Erdogan seems to have secured all democratic avenues to contest his position. 
As for the west, its leaders have the choice to either continue to throw mud on Erdogan for resorting to measures that they themselves are guilty of having used in times of necessity, and thus jeopardise an otherwise mutually beneficial relationship with Turkey; or they can pursue a fair partnership that is based on respect and is free of baseless or hypocritical accusations.
<pre>Image from: <a style="color: #808080;" href="http://www.npr.org/sections/parallels/2017/02/09/514260231/turkeys-president-erdogan-pushes-for-broader-powers">NPR</a></pre>

Turkish Opposition Left Soul-Searching After Another Loss

As international players vie for power in the Middle East, the future of Syria is more uncertain than ever 
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Four-and-a-half years have passed since the first bullet was fired on peaceful protestors marching for democratic reforms in Syria. Spurred on by the collapse of authoritarian regimes in the context of the Arab Spring sweeping across the Middle East and North Africa at the time, Syrians had come out onto the streets in their droves, calling for the end of 40 years of dictatorship by the Assad family. 
Today, however, the picture in <a href="http://www.the-platform.org.uk/2013/09/26/the-syrian-civil-war-sectarian-violence-political-agendas-and-paths-to-peace/">Syria is more complex</a>. What began as a revolution in early 2011 has evolved into an international war, with foreign players and their proxies all vying for their own interests in the region. As the conflict escalates to involve neighbouring states, the Syrian people who once dared dream of a brighter future, now find themselves under siege on all fronts. In short, the Syrian revolution has been hijacked and the future of Syria is now at the mercy of a new Cold War between the US and Russia. 
On 30th September, Russian fighter jets began bombing territories held by the Syrian opposition just hours after lawmakers in Moscow approved an aerial campaign targeting militants belonging to the self-proclaimed Islamic State (IS), which took advantage of the security vacuum and seized swathes of land in the country in 2013. 
The US has already been leading a coalition of more than 60 nations against the militants in both Syria and Iraq for a year, and has been in discussions with Russia on how to coordinate their parallel operations against this common enemy in order to avoid <a href="http://www.reuters.com/article/2015/09/11/us-mideast-syria-russia-idUSKCN0RB0ZD20150911">&#8220;unintended incidents&#8221;</a>. Although Washington and Moscow are agreed on the need to fight IS, disagreements on Syrian regime leader <a href="http://beta.trtworld.com/americas/obama-says-assad-must-go-for-isis-to-be-defeated-8635">Bashar al-Assad&#8217;s role</a> in a transition phase to end the war prevents them from fighting together. 
While Russia insists on including Assad in the country&#8217;s future, the US says that propping up the Assad regime – which is responsible for most of the <a href="http://www.businessinsider.com/assads-government-still-kills-way-more-civilians-than-isis-2015-2">quarter of a million confirmed deaths</a> in this war – will only worsen the conflict. However, there is a stark difference in the US stance towards this war today compared to the summer of 2013, when US warships gathered in the eastern Mediterranean in preparation for a possible assault on regime positions after a chemical attack on the opposition-held Damascus suburb of Ghouta, allegedly carried out by regime forces. 
US intervention may have originally been averted when Assad complied to Russian president Vladimir Putin&#8217;s proposal that he surrender his chemical arsenal to the international community, but when IS broke through the Sykes-Picot border dividing Syria and Iraq the following year, the entire narrative of the war changed, as the growing threat of Islamist extremism in the region gave Washington the justification to launch airstrikes. Assad was no longer the primary concern. 
Russia also cited the threat of IS as their reason to conduct airstrikes in Syria, but evidence increasingly suggests Russian airstrikes are instead targeting moderate opposition groups in areas where there is <a href="http://america.aljazeera.com/articles/2015/9/30/russia-says-it-has-begun-airstrikes-in-syria.html">little to no IS presence</a>. Russian foreign minister Sergei Lavrov later admitted that airstrikes are targeting other terrorist groups in addition to IS. Unfortunately, his explanation wasn&#8217;t very enlightening: “If it looks like a terrorist, if it acts like a terrorist, if it walks like a terrorist, if it fights like a terrorist, it&#8217;s a terrorist, right?&#8221; 
In other words, Moscow is in actual fact defining all forces opposed to the regime as a legitimate target for its aerial campaign. Although Lavrov denied <a href="http://www.reuters.com/article/2015/10/01/us-mideast-crisis-lavrov-fsa-idUSKCN0RV51620151001">Russia considered the Free Syrian Army (FSA)</a> a terrorist organisation and insisted on their participation in the transition phase, US Senator John McCain confirmed that FSA-affiliated groups that had been trained and equipped by the US had indeed been hit. Russian airstrikes have also targeted the <a href="http://www.nytimes.com/2015/10/02/world/middleeast/syria-russia-airstrikes-rebels-army-conquest-jaish-al-fatah.html?_r=0">Army of Conquest</a>, a coalition of local Islamist factions plus the Al Qaeda-affiliated Nusra Front, which has controlled the north-western province of Idlib near the Turkish border since March. 
While the Nusra Front has <a href="http://www.reuters.com/article/2015/08/10/us-mideast-crisis-syria-nusra-idUSKCN0QF0WP20150810">reportedly been withdrawing</a> from the Turkish border in order to focus more on their battles in other areas with Hezbollah – Iran’s Lebanon-based proxy which is fighting on the side of the Assad regime – the factions left behind in Idlib are mainly considered moderate groups also opposed to IS. However, the failure of the US and its allies to offer sufficient support to the FSA from the onset of the war resulted in many <a href="http://news.nationalpost.com/news/moderate-syrian-rebels-defecting-to-isis-blaming-lack-of-u-s-support-and-weapons">moderate fighters turning</a> to more extreme groups as the only means to topple Assad. All that is left of the FSA is a bunch of <a href="http://www.globalsecurity.org/military/world/para/fsa.htm">loosely aligned brigades</a>, bound not so much by a central command as they are by a common objective. 
Moscow, on the other hand, has been unwavering in its support for Assad, for it is the Assad regime and its Alawite stronghold in Syria&#8217;s coastal provinces that is guaranteeing Russia&#8217;s presence in the region via its only Mediterranean naval repair base in the port of Tartus. Russia is said to be expanding its naval facility as well as building an airstrip in Latakia&#8217;s Bassel al-Assad airbase. 
Iran is also seeking to create a <a href="http://www.wsj.com/articles/iran-occupies-iraq-1426116089">corridor to Damascus and the Mediterranean</a> via the Shiite-dominated Iraqi central government in Baghdad. Commanders of the Iranian Revolutionary Guard, along with Hezbollah, have long been reinforcing the regime to secure access to the strategic Beqaa Valley, which leads to the Mediterranean. As Russia continues its assault from the skies, Iran is reportedly boosting its presence in Syria with hundreds of troops arriving in the country to commence a ground offensive against the opposition. 
What will be left of Syria once this is all over is still unclear. There is a chance that the US, Russia and their respective allies in the region may have covertly agreed on its division along sectarian lines, especially in light of the recent nuclear deal achieved between Iran and the west. 
Alternatively, this may be a plot by the US to get Russia involved in another campaign similar to the Soviet defeat in Afghanistan, by setting them up for a long and costly war. By targeting moderate opposition groups, Russia risks giving legitimacy to extreme groups like IS, who seek to exploit the vulnerabilities of disillusioned Sunni Muslims in the region by <a href="http://www.dailymail.co.uk/news/article-2786039/The-1-300-year-old-apocalyptic-prophecy-predicted-war-Islamic-army-infidel-horde-Syria-fuelling-ISIS-s-brutal-killers.html">romanticising their struggle</a> as a resistance against infidel crusaders. The Russian Orthodox Church describing the campaign as &#8220;holy&#8221; certainly doesn&#8217;t help the matter. 
Nonetheless, Russia&#8217;s vision of a democratic Syria in which Assad is willing to share power with, in Putin&#8217;s words, a &#8220;healthy opposition&#8221;, would probably be no better than Ramzan Kadyrov&#8217;s puppet regime in Chechnya, where all credible opposition is silenced. If Syria is to remain united, it is unlikely Assad will stay in power while he has the blood of 250,000 people on his hands. Assad may be forced to cede power to an opposition that is willing to cooperate with Russia and Iran, but how representative his replacement will be of the Syrian people is highly debatable. 
The Syrian people have sacrificed too much for them to return to the days of dictatorship or settle for circus democracy now. Until the nations of the world reform their ways and start placing human beings above their selfish interests, this war will continue, it will escalate, it will spread and generations from now it will be recorded in history books not as a war, but as a genocide against a people who only had one demand – freedom.
<pre>Image from: http://www.reuters.com/article/2015/08/10/us-mideast-crisis-syria-nusra-idUSKCN0QF0WP20150810</pre>

Russia&#039;s Vision for Syria: A Transition With or Without Assad?

The status of Turkish Cypriots in Cyprus continues to be ignored both within the country and in Europe as a whole 
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It was while I was a teenager attending school in east London when I became aware of the fact that I was a member of a nameless community. I happened to come across my class register left open on my teacher&#8217;s desk and began to read through it, noticing a section for ethnicity had been included beside each name. The ethnicity section beside my name, however, was left blank, as was the case with all the other Turkish Cypriot students in my class. 
In another instance, my father had taken me to the Farnborough air show where he was working. All staff had to leave their passport details with security before they could enter. My father, at the time, although legally UK resident, only possessed a Turkish Republic of Northern Cyprus (TRNC) passport. The problem, however, was that this passport was not recognised anywhere in the world outside of Turkey and the TRNC. So, when he presented his passport, the security guard refused to record his details. 
Of course, having to switch planes in Turkey due to an absence of direct flights to the TRNC, as well as having our bags checked for TRNC products on our return, constantly reminded us that we were from an unrecognised state which according to the world map doesn&#8217;t exist. But for an estimated half a million Turkish Cypriots, around half of whom live in the UK, the TRNC is very real. 
For Turkish Cypriots born after the island was divided in 1974, the TRNC is the only home they know. Before 1974, both Turkish Cypriots and Greek Cypriots lived under a bi-communal government which was formed in 1960 after over eight decades of British occupation. However, failure to establish separate municipalities in accordance with the constitution and attempts to minimise Turkish Cypriot powers in parliament led to Turkish Cypriots being forced out of the government within three years. Failing to secure their return to the government over a period of two decades of talks, both before and after the 1974 intervention by Turkey, Turkish Cypriots declared the independence of the TRNC in 1983. 
Nonetheless, almost 100,000 Turkish Cypriots eagerly crossed to the Greek-Cypriot-controlled south to collect their new passports after the internationally recognised Republic of Cyprus entered the EU in 2004, even though the Greek Cypriots rejected the reunification of the island in a referendum ahead of their accession. Despite promises of recognition for the TRNC in such an event, Turkish Cypriots were only granted observer status in the Parliamentary Assembly of the Council of Europe (PACE). Furthermore, those who attend the meetings are acknowledged as &#8220;representatives of the Turkish Cypriot community in Cyprus,&#8221; not as TRNC representatives. As such, the Greek Cypriot side was rewarded by the EU for rejecting peace, while Turkish Cypriots had their appeals for self-representation shunned. 
Even as nationals of the Republic of Cyprus, Turkish Cypriots are constantly reminded of their being viewed as second-class citizens by some segments of society. In March 2014, former TRNC President Mehmet Ali Talat was speaking at a conference in the southern city of Limassol when it was stormed by a group of protesters from ELAM, the Greek Cypriot branch of Greece&#8217;s neo-Nazi Golden Dawn. Mr Talat, who throughout his term in office worked arduously to achieve peace in Cyprus, had to be evacuated as ELAM members hurled explosives. This was particularly alarming for Turkish Cypriots as it demonstrated the inability of the Greek Cypriot administration to protect them from the violence of individuals who feel that the Turkish Cypriots have no right to live in Cyprus, despite more than 400 years of Turkish Cypriot history on the island. 
The Greek Cypriot administration itself has also proven to be discriminatory against Turkish Cypriots. Just two months after the incident in Limassol, Turkish Cypriots were once again reminded of the administration&#8217;s systematic bias against them. Having been allocated two out of six seats representing the Republic of Cyprus in the European Parliamentary elections, Turkish Cypriots rushed to the polls to participate for the first time. With five candidates and over 90,000 registered voters, Turkish Cypriots were excited by the possibility of having their voices finally heard in Europe. Those who participated, however, were disappointed to find out the Greek Cypriot administration had failed to record the addresses of almost a third of Turkish Cypriot voters. Turkish Cypriots were thus denied their fundamental right to elect European Parliament representatives. 
Lacking representation, the Turkish Cypriots found themselves voiceless in the face of yet another challenge when the Greek Cypriot administration in July applied to secure protected designation of origin (PDO) status for the island&#8217;s traditional cheese, halloumi, otherwise known as hellim. This would grant the Greek Cypriots the power to control the way the cheese is produced, giving Turkish Cypriot producers no say in the standardisation process. While the Turkish Cypriot Chamber of Commerce calls for the establishment of a separate production control mechanism in the TRNC, the Greek Cypriot administration maintains that any production control mechanism outside the framework of its Ministry of Agriculture is illegal. 
So, as can be seen, although possessing Republic of Cyprus passports and being EU citizens, Turkish Cypriots can neither participate in Europe, due to obstacles placed before them by the Greek Cypriot administration, nor can they appeal to Europe due to their being extraneous to the same administration that blocks their participation. 
Turkish Cypriots living abroad also often have their voices silenced by the Greek Cypriot lobby. In the latest case, TRNC Foreign Minister Ozdil Nami was forced to relocate his public conference at the London School of Economics on 17 February to a lecture hall exclusive to LSE students and staff, after university officials received &#8220;threats&#8221; from members of the public. As a result, even British Turkish Cypriot community representatives, some of whom had travelled from outside London, were denied entry to the conference. The event literature was also edited to show Mr Nami&#8217;s title as &#8220;representative of the Turkish Cypriot community&#8221; instead of TRNC Foreign Minister. 
Therefore, not only are Turkish Cypriots prevented from making any progress in Cyprus, they are more often than not bullied away from speaking on platforms in other parts of Europe too. All the while, the EU continues to turn a blind eye to the international isolation of a people who have only ever asked for the rights outlined for them in agreements and the same rights enjoyed by all other EU citizens. 
In June 2012, just before the Republic of Cyprus took control of the EU presidency, hundreds of Turkish Cypriots marched from the European Parliament to the European Commission in Brussels dressed as ghosts. Arguing the Republic of Cyprus is not representative of the entire island, the protesters handed out leaflets describing themselves as Europe&#8217;s forgotten citizens. Ironically, however, many protesters would have had to acquire Republic of Cyprus passports in order to travel to Brussels, so technically there were no Turkish Cypriots protesting that day. As far as the EU is concerned, Turkish Cypriots are a long lost people who simply vanished into thin air half a century ago. 
In spite of the EU&#8217;s denial, Turkish Cypriots do exist, albeit as a nation of ghosts suspended in a state of limbo. Yet, unfortunately, as they call out from their unseen parallel universe, it seems that no one is willing to hear their cries.
<pre>Image from: http://springtimeofnations.blogspot.co.uk/2012_06_01_archive.html </pre>

Turkish Cypriots: The Ghosts of Europe

Britain is serving its own interests in the heightening tension between the Greek Cypriot administration and Turkey over newly-found gas reserves and is undermining its role as a guarantor of the Cyprus constitution 
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The discovery of natural gas reserves under the eastern Mediterranean seabed has recently put the island of Cyprus under the spotlight of geo-politics. The 4.54 trillion cubic feet of natural gas discovered so far in the Aphrodite field in Block 12 of the island&#8217;s Exclusive Economic Zone (EEZ) promises to revive the economy, which in March 2013 narrowly survived defaulting from the Eurozone. 
While French energy firm Total plans to begin work on Blocks 10 and 11 in 2015, Italian-South Korean consortium Eni-Kogas &#8211; which was granted rights to Blocks 2, 3 and 9 &#8211; began drilling in Block 9&#8217;s Onasagoras field in early October. Parallel to these developments, Israel &#8211; which also owns a 15 per cent stake in the Aphrodite field &#8211; has also been exploring its options with the Leviathan and Tamar gas fields found in their own EEZ. 
Europe is no doubt the primary market for these reserves, as it is looking to diversify its supply away from Russia. Although the possibility of turning Cyprus into an exporter of Liquefied Natural Gas (LNG) is being considered, competing with Algeria in the European LNG market would prove difficult. While discussions about the feasibility of a 1,200 km-long underwater pipeline from Cyprus to Greece are ongoing, experts have already dismissed the project due to the 2,000m depths and the seismic activity of the area. 
Therefore, the only realistic option appears to be channelling the gas through Turkey, which is working arduously to become an energy hub in the region. The only problem is that Turkey has opposed any agreements over the reserves until the 40-year-old &#8220;Cyprus Problem&#8221; has been resolved. To demonstrate their frustration with the Greek Cypriot administration, which has ignored Turkey&#8217;s calls to form a joint committee with their Turkish Cypriot counterparts, Turkey started their own exploration in Block 9 under the guard of warships, giving Greek Cypriot President Nicos Anastasiades reason to suspend peace talks. 
As Turkey does not recognise the Greek Cypriot-controlled government of the Republic of Cyprus &#8211; which it claims lost its legitimacy back in 1963 when it failed to uphold the constitutional rights granted to the Turkish Cypriots, who were subsequently ousted from the government &#8211; Turkey also does not recognise Greek Cypriot claims to eastern Mediterranean waters. Turkish Cypriot Professor Ata Atun from the Near East University told Anadolu Agency that as an island, Cyprus cannot claim sea territory unless it agrees to implement maritime laws introduced in 1982, which would require all concerned parties, including Turkey, to be a signatory. A former version of the law issued in 1960, to which Turkey subscribes, states that the declared EEZ of Cyprus is actually split between Turkey and Egypt. Therefore, Turkey has refused to recognise Greek Cypriot claims to its EEZ until a solution paves the way for Turkish Cypriots to be reincorporated in the political system. 
Instead of pushing harder to achieve a bi-zonal, bi-communal federal solution to the dispute &#8211; in accordance with previous agreements approved by the United Nations &#8211; the Greek Cypriot administration has been reaching out to neighbours Israel, Egypt and Greece to form an anti-Turkey coalition in a bid to squeeze them out of any possible deal over the reserves. As EU members, both Cyprus and Greece, along with Israel, are now lobbying Europe to pressure Turkey into recognising the Greek Cypriot administration. On November 13, the European Parliament Plenary passed a resolution calling on Turkish ships to leave Cypriot waters. 
Britain&#8217;s role 
As the former colonial ruler of Cyprus, Britain maintains two military bases on the island and according to the 1960 Treaty of Guarantee (which the Greek Cypriot administration no longer recognises) is alongside Turkey and Greece a guarantor of the Cyprus constitution. However, Britain refused to exercise this right when the Greek junta carried out a coup on the island in July 1974 in an attempt to unite Cyprus with Greece, leaving Turkey to intervene alone. In fact, Britain has abstained from playing such a role since failing to secure a NATO-led intervention in 1964 after then-Greek Cypriot President Archbishop Makarios lobbied the Soviet Union to warn against military action on the island. 
Despite often giving lip service to Turkey&#8217;s peace efforts in Cyprus, Britain has failed to use its guarantor status to gain political leverage over other EU states in Cypriot affairs. Instead, British Minister for Europe David Lidington recently expressed Britain&#8217;s recognition of the Greek Cypriot administration&#8217;s right to exploit hydrocarbon reserves within its EEZ, thus conforming to the EU&#8217;s position and leaving Turkey to bear the brunt of criticism for its tactics. 
However, there is a voice within Britain calling for greater sympathy with the Turkish Cypriot cause. British Conservative MEP Daniel Hannan, who serves as the secretary-general of the Alliance of European Conservatives and Reformists, rejected the EU&#8217;s resolution, slamming the decision as a punishment to the Turkish Cypriots who have &#8220;constantly supported the EU’s reunification plan&#8221;. Former British Foreign Secretary Jack Straw later urged the international community to accept the division in Cyprus, stating that partition is the only solution. On December 2nd, Lord Kilclooney asked the British government whether the UK is still a guarantor of Cyprus while pointing out the confiscation of Turkish Cypriot property to make way for a fuel terminal. 
After Prime Minister David Cameron&#8217;s official visit to Turkey on December 9th, his Turkish counterpart Ahmet Davutoglu reiterated the two guarantors&#8217; common stance regarding the resumption of the Cyprus peace talks. Only time shall confirm the level of Britain&#8217;s commitment to pressure the Greek Cypriots into returning to the negotiation table. Of course, Britain&#8217;s chief concern is maintaining its bases in Dhekelia and Akrotiri, and has therefore always been reluctant to take any position that might put this at risk. 
As much as Britain&#8217;s siding with the EU on Turkey&#8217;s behaviour was done to serve Britain&#8217;s best interests, as a guarantor of Cyprus, Britain has a responsibility to play a more direct role in encouraging the Greek Cypriots to recognise Turkey&#8217;s right to demand involvement in deals over the island&#8217;s offshore hydrocarbon reserves. Failure on behalf of the Greek Cypriots to do so will only indicate their unwillingness to solve the &#8220;Cyprus Problem&#8221;, in which case Britain would owe it to the Turkish Cypriots to recognise the permanent partitioning of the island. 
Unfortunately, however, when the Treaty of Guarantee was signed in 1960 &#8211; stating that the guarantor powers had the right to take collective or unilateral action in order to re-establish the island&#8217;s state of affairs should the constitution be breached &#8211; it appears as if each guarantor only intended to fulfil this responsibility in the event that their own interests were threatened. Just as the July 1974 coup by the Greek junta undermined Greece&#8217;s status as a guarantor, and the same way the November 1983 declaration of Turkish Cypriot independence (recognised only by Turkey) defeated the objective of Turkey&#8217;s 1974 intervention, Britain&#8217;s lack of an independent stance on the &#8220;Cyprus Problem&#8221; has likewise demonstrated that Britain does not really consider itself a guarantor of the Cyprus constitution, but rather a guarantor of its own interests in Cyprus.
<pre>Image from: http://www.balkaneu.com/</pre>

Ertan Karpazli